国内有个机构的英文简称叫做SARFT, 经常发布一些和我们的生活息息相关的规定。

最近的一个规定，跟那些经常上网看视频的朋友的生活就很有关系了，大家还是看看这个规定吧。

这个规定叫《互联网视听节目服务管理规定》，该规定里面最严格并且会产生实际影响的一条如下：

第八条 申请从事互联网视听节目服务的，应当同时具备以下条件：
　　（一）具备法人资格，为国有独资或国有控股单位，且在申请之日前三年内无违法违规记录；

仔细看一下国内的所有的视频网站的背景，恐怕只有央视的视听节目服务满足以上的要求。

国内的几个比较有名的视频网站，比如说土豆，优酷，还有PPLIVE， 都是由IT精英创立，得到风险投资的支持后才发展起来的，清一色的都是民营背景，而且如果把风险投资的海外身份算进来的话，还可以说是外资身份。如果主管机构真的严格执行上面的规定的话，这些网站面临的命运可能就是关闭或者将民营股权卖给国有单位，最后的结果可能也是倒闭。

网上的报道说这些网站都在焦急地等待后续规定的出台，期望着主管机构能够做出变通性规定。

这个规定其实可以看成国内风险投资的法律环境难以琢磨的一个例子，估计如果主管机构不对这个法条进行修改的话，那些风投的几千万美元就会随着这一纸规定的出台而烟消云散，不见踪影，更不用做海外上市的迷梦了。

想想这个SARFT其实是很好心肠的一个人，如果他是一个人的话，他应该是个道德楷模。在网上找到了下面这段文字，贴出来作为结尾。

如果SARFT是一个人：

后面一句话应该是道出了大家的心声。呵呵。

今天在纽约时报上看到一篇文章，觉得对于中国一些人的人生道理分析得很有道理，现在转贴在这里，想和大家分享一下。

标题是 “the dictatorship of talent”, 我都不好直译了。作者是纽约时报的著名评论员，戴维布鲁克斯，维基上对该君的介绍里提到他在文化评论上很有建树，创造了很多新词，最有名的就是布波族（BOBO, bourgeois bohemian的合写) 。

原文如下：

Let’s say you were born in China. You’re an only child. You have two parents and four grandparents doting on （宠爱，溺爱）you. Sometimes they even call you a spoiled little emperor.

They instill （慢慢地灌输）in you the legacy of Confucianism, especially the values of hierarchy and hard work. They send you off to school. You learn that it takes phenomenal feats of memorization to learn the Chinese characters. You become shaped by China’s intense human capital policies.

You quickly understand what a visitor understands after dozens of conversations: that today’s China is a society obsessed with talent, and that the Chinese ruling elite recruits talent the way the N.B.A. does — rigorously, ruthless, in a completely elitist manner.

As you rise in school, you see that to get into an elite university, you need to ace the exams given at the end of your senior year. Chinese students have been taking exams like this for more than 1,000 years.

The exams don’t reward all mental skills. They reward the ability to work hard and memorize things. Your adolescence is oriented around those exams — the cram seminars, the hours of preparation.

Roughly nine million students take the tests each year. The top 1 percent will go to the elite universities. Some of the others will go to second-tier schools, at best. These unfortunates will find that, while their career prospects aren’t permanently foreclosed, the odds of great success are diminished. Suicide rates at these schools are high, as students come to feel they have failed their parents.

But you succeed. You ace the exams and get into Peking University. You treat your professors like gods and know that if you earn good grades you can join the Communist Party. Westerners think the Communist Party still has something to do with political ideology. You know there is no political philosophy in China except prosperity. The Communist Party is basically a gigantic Skull and Bones （这句话有点吓人，呵呵，SKULL AND BONES 是耶鲁大学的秘密社团，美国很多的社会精英在耶鲁就读时就是改会的成员）. It is one of the social networks its members use to build wealth together.

You are truly a golden child, because you succeed in university as well. You have a number of opportunities. You could get a job at an American multinational, learn capitalist skills and then come back and become an entrepreneur. But you decide to enter government service, which is less risky and gives you chances to get rich (under the table) and serve the nation.

In one sense, your choice doesn’t matter. Whether you are in business or government, you will be members of the same corpocracy. In the West, there are tensions between government and business elites. In China, these elites are part of the same social web, cooperating for mutual enrichment.

Your life is governed by the rules of the corpocracy. Teamwork is highly valued. There are no real ideological rivalries, but different social networks compete for power and wealth. And the system does reward talent. The wonderfully named Organization Department selects people who have proven their administrative competence. You work hard. You help administer provinces. You serve as an executive at state-owned enterprises in steel and communications. You rise quickly.

When you talk to Americans, you find that they have all these weird notions about Chinese communism. You try to tell them that China isn’t a communist country anymore. It’s got a different system: meritocratic paternalism. You joke: Imagine the Ivy League taking over the shell of the Communist Party and deciding not to change the name. Imagine the Harvard Alumni Association with an army.

This is a government of talents, you tell your American friends. It rules society the way a wise father rules the family. There is some consultation with citizens, but mostly members of the guardian class decide for themselves what will serve the greater good.

The meritocratic corpocracy absorbs rival power bases. Once it seemed that economic growth would create an independent middle class, but now it is clear that the affluent parts of society have been assimilated into the state/enterprise establishment. Once there were students lobbying for democracy, but now they are content with economic freedom and opportunity.

The corpocracy doesn’t stand still. Its members are quick to admit China’s weaknesses and quick to embrace modernizing reforms (so long as the reforms never challenge the political order).

Most of all, you believe, educated paternalism has delivered the goods. China is booming. Hundreds of millions rise out of poverty. There are malls in Shanghai richer than any American counterpart. Office towers shoot up, and the Audis clog the roads.

You feel pride in what the corpocracy has achieved and now expect it to lead China’s next stage of modernization — the transition from a manufacturing economy to a service economy. But in the back of your mind you wonder: Perhaps it’s simply impossible for a top-down memorization-based elite to organize a flexible, innovative information economy, no matter how brilliant its members are.“

（这句话读起来是对我们的集体蔑视，说我们这些靠死记硬背的教育方式培养出来的人，不可能很好的组织一个有灵活性和创新性的知识经济。我不知道死记硬背和缺乏创造性之间是不是有必然的联系，但是如果真的是这样的话，作者的评论倒是给了我们敲响了警钟，我们的教育模式需要改革，不然很难提供经济变革所需要的创新型人才。但是作者可能也忽略了中国现在有很多社会精英都是在西方受过教育的，传统的教育模式所带来的不利影响可能已经慢慢磨灭掉了，这些人应该能够成为建设新的经济模式，也就是所谓服务经济或者信息经济的主力）

That’s a thought you don’t like to dwell on in the middle of the night.

觉得这张图里主教穿的衣服看起来还是蛮好看的。

配合图片的标题是 “China consecrates two Vatican approved bishops."

两个刚刚被祝圣的神父，一个是广州教区的甘俊邱神父，另一个是宜昌教区的吕守旺神父。

两人都毕业于中南神学院。

我记得大学的时候，我们班搞活动，去参观武昌革命博物纪念馆的时候路过那里。那是刚上大一，看到神学院这几个字，觉得有些惊讶，然后就觉得有点奇怪，印象中的神学院应该像电影中见到的修道院一样建在僻静的山上，怎么这个神学院却在闹市之中。

说回新闻的标题，觉得有一方真的是自作多情，呵呵。

刚刚看的新闻说前深圳市委书记李鸿忠将任湖北省代省长，俞正声走后留下来的书记的缺则由罗清泉来担任。

十七大一完，国内的高级干部职位换了一圈。

在网上看了一些关于李的一些报道，都是正面报道，介绍他在深圳的政绩。有一个亮点如下：

1999年6月，时任惠州市市长的李鸿忠在哈佛大学肯尼迪政治学院学习，他带去的案例《软性策略推动惠州工业发展》入选哈佛教程。工作在一线的中国市长的案例进入哈佛教程，李鸿忠是第一人。

相信他应该是一个有现代管理理念的政府官员。中组部的想法可能也是希望他能够把在深圳的经验带到湖北来，大力发展湖北的经济。武汉市的苗书记更是从东风直接调任的，足以看出中央想发展湖北经济的决心。

现在就只希望新到的领导能给家乡的发展带来新气象。